A recent report found that the IDF was significantly underprepared for Hamas’ attack on October 7, 2024. Due to a long series of poor decisions and misunderstandings, the IDF willfully ignored signs of Hamas’ military capabilities and intentions to attack. As a result, the IDF was not only unaware of the imminent attack but also wholly unready to respond accordingly, leading to a catastrophic situation.
Reed McIntire
22 April 2025
A recent Israeli military report has found that the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) suffered a series of errors and mismanagement that led to its defeat in the attack on Oct. 7, 2024. The Hamas-led attack was unprecedented in its boldness and the Israeli military now acknowledges a “complete failure” to prevent and respond to the threat, resulting in nearly 1200 deaths.
One of the most glaring mistakes made by the IDF was a complete underestimation of Hamas’ capabilities and willingness to engage in all-out conflict. IDF intelligence and analysts previously assumed Hamas was only willing to engage Israel from afar, using rockets and bombardments, instead of a full-scale war. However, this completely underestimated not only the commitments of Hamas fighters and leadership but also their logistical capabilities and planning.
According to the report, Israeli intelligence had knowledge of increased fighter activity and planning as early as April 2022. However, the Israeli military deemed any attack unlikely, assuming Hamas to be deterred since the Israeli incursion into Gaza in 2021, where the IDF killed over 200.
Instead, Israeli leadership assumed that Hamas and its now-deceased leader Yahya Al-Sinwar were more interested in governing Gaza as opposed to open war with Israel. As a result, Israeli planning was focused instead on the threat from Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Additionally, Israeli intelligence and leadership assumed that Hamas’ infamous tunnel networks degraded over time, therefore reducing their operational capabilities. To the contrary though, Hamas’ tunnel networks and attack routes expanded in the build up to Oct. 7, thereby increasing their operational and logistical capabilities. The local IDF forces along the border with Gaza, numbering only 767 on Oct. 7, were then quickly overwhelmed by a better prepared, more numerous Hamas force.
Even after the attack began, the IDF was slow to respond. A survivor of the attack on kibbutz Nahal Oz noted that Hamas fighters had long since left the area before the first IDF reinforcements arrived. According to the IDF’s own investigation, the first Hamas fighters entered the kibbutz at 6:30am, with additional fighters arriving at 10 and 11:00am. However, IDF troops only arrived at 1:15pm, after Hamas had already left the area. As a result of this sluggish response, 15 residents of Nahal Oz were killed and 8 were captured as hostages by Hamas.
The IDF’s famous air force was also wholly unprepared, with planes, helicopters, and manpower relocated north in preparation for any attack from Hezbollah. Air Force leadership claimed that at the time, there was only one drone monitoring Gaza, and also assumed that there would be clear warning of an imminent attack.
The inquiry additionally finds that in the direct lead-up to the attack, numerous Israeli SIM cards, known to be in the hands of Hamas fighters, were activated simultaneously – a clear indicator of an attack. Yet, IDF intelligence and leadership remained convinced that this was simply a training exercise, and the group had neither the intentions nor capabilities of a large-scale assault.
Shin Bet, Israel’s main intelligence agency, published its own investigation into its failings in March 2025. The report found that the agency had failed to properly notify and warn Israeli political and military leaders of the attack’s build-up and commencement. Reportedly, Shin Bet knew of Hamas’ attack plans well ahead of time, however according to the report these plans were poorly handled and did not result in any additional training or readiness for Shin Bet or the IDF. Additionally, the agency also cited external factors such as being unsuited to counter a well-organized military force like Hamas, and murky division of responsibilities between themselves and the IDF concerning Gaza.
Notably still, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has refused to take accountability for the lackluster preparedness and response to Hamas’ incursion. While public opposition to Netanyahu has grown in the aftermath of Oct. 7, Netanyahu still pushes the blame onto IDF and intelligence leadership.
However, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that the now-deposed director of Shin Bet, Ronen Bar, attempted to warn Netanyahu over the attacks five months ahead of time. Bar stated that the country should prepare for a wave of attacks from Hamas, however Netanyahu rebuked the assertion, instead believing Hamas to be effectively deterred from attacking Israel. As a result, Israel’s leaders were fully unprepared for the coming onslaught.
Despite his own failings though, Netanyahu has instead pushed the blame onto Bar himself. In March 2025, Netanyahu’s cabinet unanimously voted to oust Bar from his role as intelligence chief. Netanyahu cited Shin Bet’s failure to prevent the attacks of October 7 as well as leaks from the negotiations with Hamas as proof of Bar’s inability to head Israel’s intelligence apparatus. Bar however retorted, saying that the claims are “nothing more than a cover for completely different, extraneous and fundamentally invalid motives designed to disrupt the ability of the Shin Bet to fulfill its role.”
Even the Israeli public disapproves of Bar’s dismissal. In a recent Times of Israel article, reportedly 51% of Israelis opposed Bar’s firing, while only 32% approve. Additionally, 46% of Israelis trust Bar over Netanyahu. These findings come amidst a record low-point in Netanyahu’s popularity. In a survey by the Israel Democracy Institute, 48% of Israelis think Netanyahu should take responsibility for Israel’s failed response to October 7 and resign immediately, with an additional 24.5% saying he should take responsibility and resign once the war is over.
There has yet to be any inquiry into the role of Netanyahu and his cabinet in Israel’s failure to prevent and respond to Hamas’ attack. In fact, Netanyahu has said that any such investigation would inherently be biased against him, and claimed “deep state bureaucrats” seek to undermine him.
While not in the latest report, since the attacks the IDF has also been accused numerous times of using the so-called Hannibal Directive, with some officers confirming its usage.
The Hannibal Directive is an IDF procedure in which force is used on their own troops, and anyone near them, to prevent their capture. In the wake of the Oct. 7 attacks, IDF sources have admitted to using the Hannibal Directive, resulting in additional civilian and military deaths than otherwise.
Even at the beginning of Hamas’ attack, the IDF’s Gaza Division already issued the Directive, with reports claiming the Israelis were ordered to not let “a single vehicle” return to Gaza. Kidnappings were already reported by that time, meaning IDF leadership knew the order would imply the killing of their own civilians and personnel.
The losses caused by the Hannibal Directive remain undetermined, however it is clear that the IDF’s own procedures contributed to the massive loss of life that day. Despite this, Israeli media and politicians still claim that the Palestinian forces were solely responsible for the 1500 deaths in the attacks -a claim used to justify the 50 000 killed in Gaza, the majority of whom are women and children.
Ultimately, Israel’s experience on Oct. 7 was a culmination of years of misunderstanding and underestimating Hamas’ intentions and capabilities. Assuming the group to be significantly less prepared and less ambitious, led the IDF into a sense of complacency, believing that their superior firepower was deterrent enough. However, as the past two years have also shown, Hamas is notably more capable and resourceful than most would have ever predicted. As a result, Israel and the IDF will likely never forget the lessons of Oct. 7.
